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Abstract
In recent `learning to forecast' experiments with human subjects (Hommes, et al. 2005),
three di®erent patterns in aggregate asset price behavior have been observed: slow mono-
tonic convergence, permanent oscillations and dampened °uctuations. We construct a
simple model of individual learning, based on performance based evolutionary selection
or reinforcement learning among heterogeneous expectations rules, explaining these dif-
ferent aggregate outcomes. Out-of-sample predictive power of our switching model is
higher compared to the rational or other homogeneous expectations benchmarks. Our
results show that heterogeneity in expectations is crucial to describe individual forecast-
ing behavior as well as aggregate price behavior.
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11 Introduction
In an economy today's individual decisions crucially depend upon expectations or beliefs about
future developments. For example, in speculative asset markets such as the stock market, an
investor buys (sells) today when she expects prices to rise (fall) in the future. Expectations
a®ect individual decisions and the realized market outcome (e.g., prices and traded quantities)
is an aggregation of individual behavior. A market is therefore an expectations feedback system:
market history shapes individual expectations which, in turn, determine current aggregate
market behavior and so on. How do individuals actually form market expectations, and what
is the aggregate outcome of the interaction of individual market forecasts?
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that all individuals have rational expectations (Muth,
1961; Lucas and Prescott, 1971). In an economic model, forecasts then coincide with mathe-
matical expectations, conditioned upon available information. In a rational world individual
expectations coincide, on average, with market realizations, and markets are e±cient with
prices fully re°ecting economic fundamentals (Fama, 1970). In the traditional view, there is
no room for market psychology and \irrational" herding behavior. An important underpinning
of the rational approach comes from an early evolutionary argument made by Alchian (1950)
and Friedman (1953), that \irrational" traders will not survive competition and will be driven
out of the market by rational traders, who will trade against them and earn higher pro¯ts.
Following Simon (1957), many economists have argued that rationality imposes unrealis-
tically strong informational and computational requirements upon individual behavior and it
is more reasonable to model individuals as boundedly rational, using simple rules of thumb
in decision making. Laboratory experiments indeed have shown that individual decisions
under uncertainty are at odds with perfectly rational behavior, and can be much better de-
scribed by simple heuristics, which sometimes may lead to persistent biases (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman, 2003; Camerer and Fehr, 2006). Models of bounded rationality
have also been applied to forecasting behavior, and several adaptive learning algorithms have
been proposed to describe market expectations. For example, Sargent (1993) and Evans and
Honkapohja (2001) advocate the use of adaptive learning in modeling expectations and deci-
sion making in macroeconomics, while Arthur (1991), Erev and Roth (1998) and Camerer and
Ho (1999) propose reinforcement learning as an explanation of average behavior in a number
of experiments in a game-theoretical setting. In some models (Bray and Savin, 1986) adaptive
learning enforces convergence to rational expectations, while in others (Bullard, 1994) learning
may not converge at all but instead lead to excess volatility and persistent deviations from
1rational equilibrium similar to real markets (Shiller, 1981; De Bondt and Thaler, 1989). Re-
cently, models with heterogeneous expectations and evolutionary selection among forecasting
rules have been proposed, e.g., Brock and Hommes (1997) and Branch and Evans (2006), see
Hommes (2006) for an extensive overview.
Laboratory experiments with human subjects, with full control over economic fundamen-
tals, are well suited to study individual expectations and how their interaction shapes aggregate
market behavior (Marimon, Spear, and Sunder, 1993; Peterson, 1993). But the results from
laboratory experiments are mixed. Early experiments, with various market designs such as
double auction trading, show convergence to equilibrium (Smith, 1962), while more recent
asset pricing experiments exhibit deviations from equilibrium with persistent bubbles and
crashes (Smith, Suchanek, and Williams, 1988; Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and Velden,
2005). A clear explanation of these di®erent market phenomena is still lacking (Du®y, 2008).
It is particularly challenging to provide a general theory of learning which is able to explain
both the possibilities of convergence and persistent deviations from equilibrium.
In recent learning to forecast experiments, described at length in Hommes, Sonnemans, Tu-
instra, and Velden (2005), three qualitatively di®erent aggregate outcomes have been observed
in the same experimental setting. In a stationary environment participants, for 50 periods,
had to predict the price of a risky asset (say a stock) having knowledge of the fundamental
parameters (mean dividend and interest rate) and previous price realizations, but without
knowing the forecasts of others. If all agents would behave rationally or learn to behave ra-
tionally, the market price would quickly converge to a constant fundamental value pf = 60.
While in some groups in the laboratory price convergence did occur, in other groups prices
persistently °uctuate (see Fig. 2). Another striking ¯nding in the experiments is that in all
groups individuals were able to coordinate on a common predictor (see Fig. 2, lower parts
of di®erent panels). The main purpose of this paper is to present a simple model based on
evolutionary selection of simple heuristics explaining how coordination of individual forecasts
can emerge and, ultimately, enforce di®erent aggregate market outcomes. Although our model
is very simple it ¯ts the experimental data surprisingly well (see, e.g., Fig. 7).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the ¯ndings of the laboratory exper-
iment and looks at individual forecasting rules which will form the basis of our evolutionary
model. Section 3 focusses on the price dynamics under homogeneous forecasting rules which
were identi¯ed in the experiment. A learning model based on evolutionary selection between
simple forecasting heuristics is presented, analyzed and simulated in Section 4. In Section 5
we discuss how our model ¯ts the experimental data, and Section 6 concludes.
22 Learning to Forecast Experiments
In this section we discuss the laboratory experiments. Subsection 2.1 recalls the experimental
design, Subsection 2.2 focuses on aggregate price behavior, while Subsection 2.3 discusses
individual prediction rules.
2.1 Experimental Design
A number of sessions of a computerized learning to forecast experiment in the CREED labora-
tory at the University of Amsterdam have been presented in Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra,
and Velden (2005), henceforth HSTV. In each session human subjects had to predict the price
of an asset for 51 periods and have been rewarded for the accuracy of their predictions. Fig. 2
shows the result of the experiment for six di®erent groups. The reader can immediately rec-
ognize two striking results of the experiment: di®erent qualitative patterns in aggregate price
behavior and high coordination of individual forecasts, even though individuals do not know
the forecasts of others. Before starting to develop an explanation for these ¯ndings, we brie°y
describe the experimental design.
Each market consists of six participants, who were told that they are advisors to a pension
fund which can invest money either in a risk-free or in a risky asset. In each period the
risk-free asset pays a ¯xed interest rate r, while the risky asset pays stochastic dividends,
independently identically distributed (IID), with mean ¹ y. Trading in the risky asset had been
computerized, using an optimal demand schedule derived from maximization of myopic CARA
mean-variance utility, given the subject's individual forecast. Hence, subject's only task in
every period was to give a two period ahead point prediction for the price of the risky asset,
and their earnings were inversely related to their prediction errors. An advantage of this
approach is that it provides clean data on expectations, assuming all other underlying model
assumptions to be satis¯ed. Learning to forecast experimental data can be used as a test
bed for various expectations hypotheses, such as rational expectations or adaptive learning
models, in any benchmark dynamic economic model with all other assumptions controlled by
the experimenter; see the discussion in Du®y (2008).
Participants in the experiments knew that the actual price realization of the risky asset is
determined by market clearing on the basis of the investment strategies of the pension fund.
The exact functional form of the strategies and the market equilibrium equation were unknown
to the participants. However, they were informed that the higher their own forecast is, the
larger will be the demand for the risky asset. Stated di®erently, they knew that there was
3positive feedback from individual price forecasts to the realized market price. They were also
aware that, ultimately, the demand also depends on the forecasts of other participants, but
they did not know the number nor their identity.
More formally the session of the experiment can be presented as follows. At the beginning
of every period t = 0;:::;50 every participant i = 1;:::;6 provides a forecast for the price
of the risky asset in the next period, pt+1, given the available information. An individual
forecast, pe
i;t+1, can be any number (with two decimals) between 0 and 100. The information
set Ii;t, at date t, consists of past prices, past own predictions1, past own earnings ei;t and the





i;t;ei;0;:::;ei;t¡1;r; ¹ yg: (2.1)
Note that, since the price pt is unknown at the beginning of period t, it is not included in
the information set. The same holds for the earnings ei;t in period t, which will depend on
the price pt. Notice also that participants can, in principle, compute the rational fundamental
price of the risky asset, pf = ¹ y=r = 60, given by the discounted sum of the expected future
dividend stream.
The market clearing price was computed according to a standard mean-variance asset
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and the fundamental forecast pf given by a small fraction nt of \robot" traders. It is also
a®ected by a small stochastic term "t, representing, e.g., demand or supply shocks. The robot
traders were introduced in the experiment as a far from equilibrium stabilizing force to prevent
the occurrence of long lasting bubbles. The fraction of robot traders increased in response to
the deviations of the asset price from its fundamental level:











This mechanism re°ects the feature that in real markets there is more agreement about over- or
undervaluation of an asset when the price deviation from the fundamental level is large2.
1Past prices and predictions were visualized on the computer screen both in a graph and a table.
2In the experiments the fraction of robot trader never became larger than 0:2. Recently, Hommes, Sonne-
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Figure 1: Price evolution and prediction errors (inner frame) under Rational Fun-
damental Expectations. When every participant predicts pf the realized price (red) °uctuates
around fundamental level. Small, non-systematic prediction errors (blue) are due to stochastic shocks.
At the end of the period every participant was informed about the realized price pt. The















so that forecasting errors exceeding 7 would result in no reward at a given period. At the end
of the session the accumulated earnings of every participant were converted to euros (1 point
computed as in (2.4) corresponded to 50 cents) and paid out.
There were seven sessions of the experiment, each with the same realizations of the stochas-
tic shocks "t drawn independently from a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard
deviation 0:5. The same stochastic process f"tg50
t=0 will be used in our simulations.
Fig. 1 shows the simulation of realized prices, which would occur when all individuals
use the rational, fundamental forecasting rule, pe
i;t+1 = pf, for all i and t. Under rational
expectations the realized price pt = "t=(1 + r) randomly °uctuates around the fundamental
level pf = ¹ y=r = 60 with small amplitude. In the experiment, one can not expect rational














































































































































































Figure 2: Three di®erent qualitative outcomes in 6 sessions of the forecasting ex-
periment. For every panel an upper part shows observed prices (red) in comparison with the
fundamental level (black); a lower part shows individual predictions of 6 participants with forecast-
ing errors in an inner frame. In two sessions (upper panels) the price converges monotonically to
the fundamental value, in two sessions (middle panels) price exhibited persistent oscillations, in
two sessions (lower panels) the price converged through large (observe the change of scale for group
4) but damping oscillations. 62.2 Aggregate price behavior
Fig. 2 shows time series of prices, individual predictions and forecasting errors in six di®erent
sessions of the experiment. A striking feature of aggregate price behavior is that three dif-
ferent qualitative patterns emerge. The prices in groups 2 and 5 converge slowly and almost
monotonically to the fundamental price level. In groups 1 and 6 persistent oscillations are
observed during the entire experiment. In groups 4 and 7 prices are also °uctuating but their
amplitude is decreasing.3
A second striking result concerns individual predictions. In all groups participants were
able to coordinate their forecasting activity. The forecasts, as shown in the lower parts of the
panels in Fig. 2, are dispersed in the ¯rst periods but then become very close to each other
in all groups.4 The coordination of individual forecasts has been achieved in the absence of
any communication between subjects and knowledge of past and present predictions of other
participants.
To summarize, in the HSTV learning to forecast experiment we have the following:
- participants were unable to learn the rational, fundamental forecasting rule; only in
some cases individual predictions moved (slowly) in the direction of the fundamental
price towards the end of the experiment;
- three di®erent price patterns were observed: (i) slow, (almost) monotonic convergence,
(ii) persistent price oscillations with almost constant amplitude, and (iii) large initial
oscillations dampening slowly towards the end of the experiment;
- already after a short transient, participants were able to coordinate their forecasting
activity, submitting similar forecasts in every period.
The purpose of this paper is to explain these \stylized facts" simultaneously by a simple
model of individual learning behavior.
3Price dynamics in group 3 (not shown, but see the concluding remarks) is more di±cult to classify. Similar
to group 1 it started with moderate oscillations, then stabilized at a level below the fundamental, suddenly
falling in period t = 40, probably due to a typing error of one of the participants.
4To quantify the degree of coordination, HSTV analyze the average prediction error over time and across
the six participants for each group. It turns out that this error is explained more by the \common" prediction
error (measured as the deviation of the average prediction from the realized price), than by the dispersion
between individual predictions. Even in groups 4 and 7 with the lowest coordination, the dispersion between
individual predictions accounts only for 29% and 34%, respectively, of the average total prediction error.
72.3 Individual Forecasting Rules
Which forecasting rules did individuals use in the learning to forecast experiment? Comparison
of the RE benchmark in Fig. 1 with the lab experiments in Fig. 2 suggests that rational
expectations is not a good explanation of individual forecasting and aggregate behavior. For
the oscillating groups 1 and 6 this is immediately clear. One could perhaps argue that the
other groups show a tendency to converge to RE after 50 periods, but in contrast to the RE-
benchmark, e.g., in the monotonically converging groups 2 and 5 market prices are consistently
below the RE-benchmark 60. Moreover, RE does not explain the slowly dampened oscillating
patterns.
To get some intuition for individual behavior it is useful to look at some of the time evo-
lution of individual predictions. Fig. 3 shows time series of some (lagged) individual forecasts
together with the realized price. The timing in the ¯gure is important. For every time t
on the horizontal axes we show the price pt together with the individual two-period ahead
forecast pe
i;t+2 of that price by some participant i. In this way we can infer graphically how the
two-period ahead forecast pe
i;t+2 uses the last observed price pt. For example, if they coincide,
i.e., pe
i;t+2 = pt, it implies naive expectations in period t.
In group 2, subject 5 extrapolates price changes in the early stage of the experiment (see
the upper left panel), but, starting from period t = 6, uses a simple naive rule pe
t+2 = pt.
In other words, in period 6, subject 5 switched from an extrapolative to a naive forecasting
rule. Subject 1 from the same group used a \smoother", adaptive forecasting strategy, always
predicting a price between the previous forecast and the previous price realization. These
graphs already suggest individual heterogeneity in forecasting strategies.
In the oscillating group 6, subject 1 used naive expectations in the ¯rst half of the ex-
periment (until period 24, see the upper right panel). Naive expectations however, lead to
prediction errors in an oscillating market, especially when the trend reverses. In period 25
subject 1 switches to a di®erent, trend extrapolating prediction strategy. Thereafter, this sub-
ject uses a trend extrapolating strategy switching back to the naive rule at periods of expected
trend reversal (e.g., in periods 27 and 28, 32 and 33, 37 and 38, 42, 43 and 44, and 47).
Interestingly, participant 3 from another oscillating group 1 starts out predicting the fun-
damental price, i.e., pe
t+1 = pf = 60 in the ¯rst four periods of the experiments (see the lower
left panel). But since the majority in group 1 predicts a lower price, the realized price is much
lower than the fundamental, causing participant 3 to switch to a di®erent, trend extrapolating
strategy. Trend extrapolating predictions overshoot the realized market price at the moments
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Group 7, participant 3
prediction price
Figure 3: Switching of the experiment's participants between simple rules. For any
point on the abscissa, representing time t, the price pt (red) and the forecast pe
i;t+2 (blue) are shown.
This forecast, pe
i;t+2, was made immediately after the announcement of the price pt.
trend changes to some extent.
Finally, in group 7 with dampened price oscillations subject 3 started out with a strong
trend extrapolation (see the lower right panel). Despite very large prediction errors (and thus
low earnings) at the turning points, this participant sticked to strong trend extrapolation.
Perhaps only in the last 4 periods some kind of adaptive expectations strategy was used.
Using the individual experimental data HSTV estimated the forecasting rules for each




h;t+1 = ®h + ¯hpt¡1 + °h(pt¡1 ¡ pt¡2) + ±hp
e
h;t (2.5)
were estimated. These rules are so-called ¯rst order heuristics, since they only use the last
forecast, the last observed price and the last observed price change to predict the future price.
Remarkably, individual forecasts are well explained by the ¯rst order heuristics: for 33 out of
942 participants (i.e., for 78%) an estimated linear rule falls into this simple class with an R2
typically higher than 0:80. In fact, within the class of ¯rst order heuristics three extremely
simple rules came up from the estimation results, characterizing the three di®erent observed
aggregate outcome: convergence, permanent oscillations and dampened oscillations.








t + w(pt¡1 ¡ p
e
t); (2.6)
with weight 0 · w · 1. Note that at the moment when the forecast for the price pt+1 is
submitted, the price pt is still unknown (see Eq. 2.2), so that the last observed price is pt¡1.
At the same time, the last forecast pe
t is of course known when forecasting pt+1. Notice also
that for w = 1, we obtain the special case of naive expectations.5 The individual forecast series
shown in the upper left panel of Fig. 3 are examples of estimated rules of the form (2.6), with
w = 1 for subject 5 and w ' 0:25 for subject 1.
Especially for the subjects in the permanent and the dampened oscillating groups estima-
tion revealed a simple trend-following forecasting rule of the form:
p
e
t+1 = pt¡1 + ° (pt¡1 ¡ pt¡2); (2.7)
where ° > 0. This rule has a simple behavioral interpretation: the forecast uses the last price
observation and adjusts in the direction of the last price change. The extrapolation coe±cient
° measures the strength of the adjustment. The estimates of this coe±cient ranged from
relatively small extrapolation values, ° = 0:4, to quite strong extrapolation values, ° = 1:3.
Finally, especially in the permanently oscillating groups 1 and 6, a number of participants




f + pt¡1) + (pt¡1 ¡ pt¡2): (2.8)
This is an example of an anchoring and adjustment rule (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), since
it extrapolates the last price change from the reference point or anchor (pf+pt¡1)=2 describing
the \long-run" price level. One could argue that the anchor for this rule, de¯ned as an equally
weighted average between the last observed price and the fundamental price, was unknown
5The adaptive rule (2.6) was estimated for 5 out of 12 participants in groups 2 and 5, and three among
them had w insigni¯cantly di®erent from 1 (i.e., they used naive rule). Four other participants used an AR(1)
rule, pe
t+1 = a + bpt¡1, conditioning only on the past price with a coe±cient b < 1.
10in the experiment, since subjects were not provided explicitly with the fundamental price.6
Therefore, in our evolutionary selection model in Section 4 one of the rules will be we (2.8)
with the fundamental price pf replaced by a proxy given by the (observable) sample average
of past prices pav
t¡1 =
Pt¡1





t¡1 + pt¡1) + (pt¡1 ¡ pt¡2): (2.9)
To distinguish these rules, we will refer to the forecasting rule (2.8), with an anchor partly
determined by the ¯xed fundamental price pf, simply as an anchoring and adjustment (AA)
heuristic, and to the more °exible forecasting rule (2.9), with an anchor learned through a
sample average of past prices, as the learning anchoring and adjustment (LAA) heuristic.
Two important observations follow by the above discussion. First, the subjects in the
experiment tended to base their predictions on past observations, using relatively simple and
intuitive rules of thumb, such as adaptive expectations or trend extrapolation. Second, it
seems that participants tried to learn from past errors, and their learning behavior was in
the form of switching between di®erent heuristics. These two observations, simplicity of the
forecasting strategy and (imperfect) evolutionary switching on seemingly more successful rules
will form the basis of our learning model in Section 4.
3 Price Behavior under Homogeneous Expectations
Having a set of estimated individual forecasting rules, one can ask whether these homogeneous
expectation rules can generate the qualitatively di®erent patterns observed in the experiments.
The experimental evidence about forecasting behavior suggests strong coordination on a com-
mon prediction rule. One can therefore suspect that this common rule (which, for whatever
reason, turned out to be di®erent in di®erent groups) generates the resulting pattern. In
this Section we investigate this conjecture by studying price °uctuations under homogeneous
expectations in the forecasting experiment.
6It is remarkable that exactly this anchor and adjustment rule (2.8) was estimated for participant 3 in
group 1, who did submit the fundamental price forecast in the ¯rst four periods of the experiment, see the
lower left panel of Fig. 3. For 4 out of 12 participants of groups 1 and 6 the estimated AR(2) rule was very
close to (2.8), as it can be be seen in the middle panels of Fig. 6.
11The model with homogeneous expectations is given by
8
> > > > > <























t+1 + nt p




The ¯rst equation describes forecasting behavior with a simple ¯rst order heuristic f as in
(2.5), which can be either adaptive expectations (in which case f does not depend on pt¡2) or
trend following expectations (in which case f does not depend on pe
t). The second equation
gives the evolution of the share of \robot" traders, identical to the rule used in the experiment.
The third equation is the equilibrium pricing equation used in the experiment, cf. (2.2). We
present an analysis of the so-called deterministic skeleton model, setting term "t in (3.1) to
zero, as well as stochastic simulations with the same realizations of the shocks, "t, as in
the experiment, in order to investigate how the noise a®ects price °uctuations. In terms of




















Fig. 4 shows example of simulated dynamics for di®erent adaptive, trend-following and anchor-
ing and adjustment rules which have been estimated from individual forecasting experimental
data.
3.1 Adaptive Heuristic
Assume that all participants use the same adaptive heuristic pe
t+1 = wpt¡1+(1¡w)pe
t in their
forecasting activity. Notice that naive expectations is obtained as a special case, for w = 1.
The following result describes the behavior of system (3.1) in this case.
Proposition 3.1. Consider the deterministic skeleton of (3.1) with the adaptive prediction
rule (2.6). This system has a unique steady-state with price equal to fundamental price, i.e.
p¤ = pf. The steady-state is globally stable for 0 < w · 1, with a real eigenvalue ¸, 0 < ¸ < 1,
so that the convergence is monotonic.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The dynamics with the adaptive forecasting heuristic is illustrated in the upper left panel
of Fig. 4 for two di®erent values of the weight w assigned to the past price. When the weight
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Figure 4: Model (3.1) with homogeneous expectations. The trajectories of the determin-
istic skeleton (the curves) and stochastic simulations with the same realization of shocks as in the
experiment (triangles and squares) for di®erent forecasting heuristics. Upper left panel: Dynamics
with the adaptive forecast converge to the fundamental steady-state. Upper right panel: Dynam-
ics with weak trend extrapolation converges to the fundamental steady-state. Convergence can be
either monotonic (for small extrapolation coe±cients), or oscillating (for high coe±cients). Lower
left panel: Dynamics with the strong trend extrapolation oscillates (slowly) around the fundamen-
tal steady-state and diverges to a quasi-periodic cycle. Lower right panel: Dynamics with the
anchoring and adjustment heuristic oscillates around the steady-state and (ultimately) converges.
The same heuristic with learned anchor generates small amplitude oscillations around its current
long-run estimation, which converges very slowly and almost monotonically.
and the price converges slowly to the fundamental steady-state. In the case of larger weight,
e.g., w = 0:65 as estimated for subject 4 of group 5, convergence is somewhat faster. In the
case of adaptive expectations, the role of stochastic shocks is minimal. Shocks slightly perturb
the system, but the stochastic price series (shown by triangles and squares) still exhibit almost
monotonic convergence. Adaptive expectations thus seems a good explanation of the aggregate
price pattern observed in the experimental groups 2 and 5.
133.2 Extrapolative Rules
Consider now the dynamics with homogeneous extrapolative expectations. For the sake of
generality we write the extrapolative forecasting rule as:
p
e
t+1 = ® + ¯1 pt¡1 + ¯2 pt¡2 : (3.3)
This extrapolative rule contains both the trend following and the anchor and adjustment
heuristic as special cases. Indeed, setting ® = 0, ¯1 = 1 + ° and ¯2 = ¡°, the trend-
following heuristics (2.7) is obtained, while ® = pf=2, ¯1 = 1:5 and ¯2 = ¡1 correspond to the
anchoring and adjustment heuristic (2.8). The rules for which the forecasts are not consistent
with realizations will be disregarded by the participants, sooner or later. Therefore, both in
the formal analysis and in simulations we con¯ne our attention to the rules satisfying the
following simple steady-state consistency requirement:
De¯nition 3.1. The extrapolative rule (3.3) is called consistent in the steady-state p¤, if it
predicts p¤ in this steady-state.
In other words, consistent rules give unbiased predictions at the steady-state. Obviously,
the extrapolative rule is consistent in p¤ if and only if ® = (1 ¡ ¯1 ¡ ¯2)p¤. Notice that,
the trend-following heuristic (2.7) is consistent at any steady-state, while the anchoring and
adjustment heuristic (2.8) is consistent only at the steady state with p¤ = pf.7
The following result describes all possible steady-states of the asset-pricing dynamics with
consistent extrapolative heuristic, as well as their local stability.
Proposition 3.2. Consider the dynamics of the deterministic skeleton of (3.1) with extrap-
olative prediction rule (3.3).
There exists a unique steady-state in which the rule is consistent. In this steady-state,
p¤ = pf and the fraction of robot traders n¤ = 0. The \fundamental" steady-state is locally
stable if the following three conditions are met
¯2 < (1 + r) ¡ ¯1 ; ¯2 < (1 + r) + ¯1 ; ¯2 > ¡(1 + r): (3.4)
The steady-state generically exhibits a pitch-fork, period-doubling or Neimark-Sacker bifurca-
tion, if the ¯rst, second or third inequality in (3.4) turns into an equality, respectively. More-
over, the dynamics is oscillating (i.e., the eigenvalues of the linearized system are complex)
when ¯2
1 + 4¯2(1 + r) < 0.
7In related learning-to-forecasting experiments Heemeijer, Hommes, Sonnemans, and Tuinstra (2009) ¯nd
that the estimated linear forecasting rules for many subjects are consistent in the steady state p¤ = pf, both
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Figure 5: Stability of the fundamental steady-state in an asset-pricing model with
homogeneous extrapolative expectations. The dynamics (3.1) with expectations (3.3) con-
verges to the fundamental steady-state if the pair of coe±cients (¯1;¯2) belongs to the union of light
and dark grey regions. The edges of the triangle at the border of the stability region correspond
to pitchfork, period-doubling and Neimark-Sacker bifurcations respectively. The price dynamics is
oscillating if the pair (¯1;¯2) lies below the parabolic curve. The three dots correspond to two trend-
following heuristics (labeled ° = 0:4 and ° = 1:3) and an anchoring and adjustment heuristic (labeled
AA), which will be used in the learning model in Section 4.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In general, the dynamical system (3.1) with homogeneous extrapolative expectations (3.3)
may have multiple steady-states. Proposition 3.2 asserts, however, that the extrapolative
rule is consistent only in the fundamental steady state pf. The stability conditions (3.4) are
illustrated in Fig. 5 in the parameter space (¯1;¯2). The dark regions contain all rules for
which the extrapolative heuristic (3.3) generates stable dynamics. For the pairs lying below
the parabolic curve, the dynamics are oscillating. A loss of (local) stability occurs when the
pair (¯1;¯2) leaves the stability area and crosses the boundary formed by the triangle. The
dynamics immediately after the bifurcation are determined by the type of bifurcation through
which stability is lost. For instance, after the pitchfork bifurcation the price diverges from its
fundamental level and converges to one of two new stable steady-states. The Neimark-Sacker
bifurcation implies existence of (quasi-)periodic price °uctuations right after the bifurcation.
The three dots shown in Fig. 5 correspond to three extrapolative forecasting rules estimated
from individual experimental data. Two trend-following heuristic (2.7) with di®erent values
15of the extrapolation coe±cient ° are labeled as ° = 0:4 and ° = 1:3. The anchoring and
adjustment heuristic (2.8) is labeled as AA.
Trend-following heuristic. These results imply that the price may either converge or
diverge under the trend-following rule (2.7), depending upon the parameter °. To distinguish
between these two cases we will use the terms weak and strong trend extrapolation.
The dynamics with the weak trend extrapolation is illustrated in the upper right panel of
Fig. 4. When the extrapolative coe±cient is small (e.g., ° = 0:4), convergence is monotonic;
for larger °-values (e.g., ° = 0:99) convergence becomes oscillatory. Notice however that these
stable oscillations are di®erent (e.g., of lower frequency) compared to the dampened oscillations
observed in groups 4 and 7 in the experiments. Indeed, the estimation of individual strategies
in groups 4 and 7 did not reveal a trend-following rule which would generate such converging
oscillations. The case of the strong trend extrapolation is illustrated in the bottom left panel
of Fig. 4. The price dynamics diverges from the fundamental steady state throughoscillations
of increasing amplitude. The speed of divergence and amplitude of the long run °uctuations
increase with °, as shown by comparison of the cases ° = 1:1 and ° = 1:3.
Anchoring and adjustment heuristic. Applying Proposition 3.2 to the anchoring and
adjustment rule (2.8) we conclude that the implied price dynamics is converging. Since the
parameters of the anchoring and adjustment rule are very close to the Neimark-Sacker bifur-
cation, the convergence to the fundamental steady-state is oscillatory and slow (cf. the bottom
right panel of Fig. 4). For the stochastic simulation the convergence is even slower and the
amplitude of the price °uctuations remains more or less constant in the last 20 periods, with
an amplitude ranging from 55 to 65 comparable to that of the permanently oscillatory group
6 in the experiments. The small shocks "t added in the experimental design, to mimic (small)
shocks in a real market, thus seem to be important to keep the price oscillations alive.
The bottom right panel of Fig. 4 also shows the price dynamics of the learning anchoring
and adjustment (LAA) rule (2.9). Notice that the dynamics with a LAA heuristic is described
by a non-autonomous system, whose formal analysis is complicated. Simulations under ho-
mogeneous expectations given by the LAA heuristic (2.9) converge to the same fundamental
steady-state as with the anchoring and adjustment heuristic (2.8), but much slower and with
less pronounced oscillations. In the presence of noise, the price oscillations under the LAA
heuristic are qualitatively similar to the price °uctuations in the permanently oscillatory group
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Figure 6: Stability of a model with homogeneous extrapolative rules estimated in
the experiment. Upper panel: In both groups with converging price, all rules generate stable
monotonic dynamics. Middle panel: In both groups with oscillating price, there were two rules on
the stability border of the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. Lower panel: In both groups with damping
oscillations, both stable and unstable rules were present.
17Homogeneity versus heterogeneity
In this Section we analyzed the price dynamics underlying the experiment, under the assump-
tion that expectations are homogeneous and all individuals use the same forecasting heuristic.
Qualitatively, all three observed patterns in the experiments, monotonic convergence, constant
oscillations and dampened oscillations can be reproduced. However, the dampened oscillations
have a di®erent amplitude and frequency compared to the experimental groups 4 and 7. More-
over, a model with homogeneous expectations leaves open the question why di®erent patterns
in aggregate behavior emerged in di®erent experimental groups.
The dots in Fig. 6 represent the coe±cients of the estimated individual extrapolative rules
(3.3).8 While the dispersion of individual forecasting rules is clear, the ¯gure suggests some
regularities. In the converging groups 2 and 5, the majority of rules belong to the region of
monotonic convergence. In contrast, in the oscillating groups almost all individual rules lie in
the oscillatory region (i.e., the linear forecasting rule has complex eigenvalues). Furthermore,
in groups 1 and 6 with constant price oscillations, at least two individual rules in every group
are very close to the locus of the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation (i.e., are close to complex unit
roots), while in groups 4 and 7 with dampened oscillations there is at least one (strongly)
unstable individual forecasting rule. These results suggest that heterogeneous expectations
may be a key element in order to explain the learning to forecast experiments.
4 Heuristics Switching Model
In this Section we present a simple model with evolutionary selection between di®erent simple
forecasting heuristics. Before describing the model, we recall the most important \stylized
facts" which we found in the individual and aggregate experimental data:
- participants tend to base their predictions on past observations following simple fore-
casting heuristics;
- individual learning has a form of switching from one heuristic to another;
- in every group some form of coordination of individual forecasts occurs; the rule on
which individuals coordinate may be di®erent in di®erent groups;
8In every group there were rules which cannot be represented by the extrapolative prediction (3.3), e.g., an
adaptive heuristic or linear rules with three lags.
18- coordination of individual forecasting rules is not perfect and some heterogeneity of the
applied rules remains at every time period.
The main idea of the model is simple. Assume that there exists a pool of simple prediction
rules (e.g., adaptive or trend-following heuristics) commonly available to the participants of
the experiment. At every time period these heuristics deliver forecasts for next period's price,
and the realized market price depends upon these individual forecasts. However, the impacts
of di®erent forecasting heuristics upon the realized prices are changing over time because the
participants are learning based on evolutionary selection: the better a heuristic performed in
the past, the higher its impact in determining next period's price. As a result, the realized
market price and impact of the forecasting heuristics co-evolve in a dynamic process with
mutual feedback. It turns out that this evolutionary model exhibits path dependence explaining
coordination on di®erent forecasting heuristics leading to di®erent aggregate price behavior.
The Model
Let H denote a set of H heuristics which participants can use for price prediction. In the
beginning of period t every rule h 2 H gives a two-period ahead point prediction for the price
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t+1 is the average predicted price, r is the risk free interest rate, ¹ y is the mean dividend,
and "t is the noise term. Finally, nt is the share of robot traders evolving as in the experiment
(cf. (2.3)) according to











In all simulations we use the same parameter values and the same realization of stochastic
shocks "t as in the experiment. In particular, the fundamental price as predicted by robots is
set to pf = ¹ y=r = 0:05=3 = 60.
In our evolutionary model, the average ¹ pe
t+1 in (4.2) is a population weighted average of










h;t+1 de¯ned in (4.1). The weight nh;t assigned to the heuristic h is called the impact of
this heuristic. The impact is evolving over time and depends on the past relative performance
of all H heuristics, with more successful heuristics attracting more followers.
Similar to the incentive structure in the experiment, the performance measure of a fore-
casting heuristic in a given period is based on its squared forecasting error. More precisely,






¢2 + ´ Uh;t¡2 : (4.5)
The parameter 0 · ´ · 1 represents the memory, measuring the relative weight agents give to
past errors of heuristic h. In the special case ´ = 0, the impact of each heuristic is completely
determined by the most recent forecasting error; for 0 < ´ · 1 all past prediction errors, with
exponentially declining weights, a®ect the impact of the heuristics.
Given the performance measure, the impact of rule h is updated according to a discrete
choice model with asynchronous updating






h=1 exp(¯ Uh;t¡1) is a normalization factor. In the special case ± = 0, (4.6)
reduces to the the discrete choice model with synchronous updating used in Brock and Hommes
(1997) to describe endogenous selection of expectations. The more general case, 0 · ± · 1,
gives some persistence or inertia in the impact of rule h, re°ecting the fact (consistent with
the experimental data) that not all the participants update their rule in every period or at
the same time (see Hommes, Huang, and Wang (2005) and Diks and van der Weide (2005)).
Hence, ± may be interpreted as the average per period fraction of individuals who stick to their
previous strategy. In the extreme case ± = 1, the initial impacts of the rules never change,
no matter what their past performance was. If 0 < ± · 1, in each period a fraction 1 ¡ ± of
participants update their rule according to the discrete choice model. The parameter ¯ ¸ 0
represents the intensity of choice measuring how sensitive individuals are to di®erences in
strategy performance. The higher the intensity of choice ¯, the faster individuals will switch
to more successful rules. In the extreme case ¯ = 0, the impacts in (4.6) move to an equal
distribution independent of their past performance. At the other extreme ¯ = 1, all agents
who update their heuristic (i.e., a fraction 1 ¡ ±) switch to the most successful predictor.
Initialization. The model is initialized by a sequence fp0;p1;:::;ping of initial prices, long
enough to allow any forecasting rule in H to generate its prediction, as well as an initial distri-
20bution fnh;ing;1 · h · H of the impacts of di®erent heuristic (summing to 1). Additionally,
the initial share of robot traders and initial performances of all H heuristics are set to 0.
Given initial prices, the heuristic's forecasts can be computed and, using the initial im-
pacts of the heuristics, the price pin+1 can be computed. In the next period, the forecasts of
the heuristics are updated, the fraction of robot traders is computed, while the same initial
impacts nh;in for the individual rules are used, since past performance is not well de¯ned yet.
Thereafter, the price pin+2 is computed and the initialization stage is ¯nished. After this ini-
tialization state the evolution according to (4.2) is well de¯ned: ¯rst the performance measure
in (4.5) is updated, then, the new impacts of the heuristics are computed according to (4.6),
and the new prediction of the heuristics are obtained according to (4.1). Finally, the new
average forecast (4.4) and the new fraction of robot traders (4.3) are computed, and a new
price is determined by (4.2).
Example with Four Heuristics
The evolutionary model can be simulated with an arbitrary set of heuristics.9 Since one
of our goals is to explain the three di®erent observed patterns in aggregate price behavior
{ monotonic convergence, permanent oscillations and dampened oscillations { we keep the
number of heuristics as small as possible and consider a model with only four forecasting rules.
These rules, referred to as ADA, WTR, STR and LAA and given in Table 1, were obtained as
simple descriptions of typical individual forecasting behavior observed and estimated in the
experiments, as discussed in Section 3.
The evolutionary model with 4 forecasting heuristics is given by:
8
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9The software for simulations evexex is freely available at http://www.cafed.eu/evexex together with a
brief documentation and con¯guration settings used for the simulations reported below.
21Table 1: Heuristics used in the evolutionary model. In simulations in Figs. ??{?? the ¯rst
four heuristics are used. The LAA heuristic is obtained from the simpler AA heuristic, by replacing
the (unknown) fundamental price pf by the sample average pav
t¡1.
ADA adaptive heuristic pe
1;t+1 = 0:65pt¡1 + 0:35pe
1;t
WTR weak trend-following rule pe
2;t+1 = pt¡1 + 0:4(pt¡1 ¡ pt¡2)
STR strong trend-following rule pe





t¡1 + pt¡1) + (pt¡1 ¡ pt¡2)




4;t+1 = 0:5(pf + pt¡1) + (pt¡1 ¡ pt¡2)
rule with ¯xed anchor
where as before pav
t¡1 stands for the average of all past prices up to pt¡1. Notice that for the











Comparing with (3.2) we observe that our model can be seen as a generalization of the ho-
mogeneous expectation model to the case of heterogeneous expectations with the forecast
pe
t+1 replaced by a weighted average, with endogenous, time varying weights, of the individual
forecasts of the four heuristics.
Due to the presence of demand/supply shocks "t in the pricing equation, the model (4.7)
is stochastic. With the four forecasting heuristics ¯xed, matched by experimental individual
forecasting data, there are only three free \learning" parameters in the model: ¯, ´ and ±.
Provided that these parameters are given, the system (4.7) is initialized with two initial prices,
p0 and p1, and four initial impacts nh;in used in periods t = 2 and t = 3.
Anufriev and Hommes (2009) simulated 50-period ahead time series forecasts (\simulated
paths") of the model with the same realization of the noise process f"tg50
t=0 as in the ex-
periment. They showed that for a speci¯c choice of the parameters, ¯ = 0:4, ´ = 0:7 and
± = 0:9 (obtained after some trial and error simulations) the model exhibits path dependence
and can replicate all three di®erent qualitative patterns {monotonic convergence, permanent
oscillations and dampened oscillations{ observed in the experiments.
The initial distribution of agents over the four heuristics, i.e., initial impacts fn1;0;n2;0;n3;0;n4;0g,
turn out to be important in order to replicate the aggregate price patterns in the 50-periods
ahead forecasting simulations. For replication of the monotonic convergence in groups 2 and
225, the initial impacts of heuristics are distributed almost uniformly, with a slight dominance of
the WTR heuristics to produce a small initial trend in prices. For the oscillating groups 1 and
6, where the initial trend was stronger, both trend heuristics WTR and STR were initialized
with somewhat higher weights. Finally, in the dampened oscillating groups 4 and 7, with the
strongest trend in price in initial periods, the STR rule has a large initial impact.
5 Empirical Validation
In this section we address the issue of how well the nonlinear stochastic switching model with
four forecasting heuristics ¯ts with the experimental data. This section is divided in three
parts. We, ¯rst, illustrate the one-period ahead forecasts of the model visually, then turn
to the rigorous evaluation of the in-sample performance of the model, and, ¯nally, look at
out-of-sample forecasts made by the model.
5.1 One-period ahead simulations
Fig. 7 compares the experimental data with the one-step ahead predictions made by our
model, using the same benchmark parameters ¯ = 0:4, ´ = 0:7 and ± = 0:9 as before. In
these simulations the initial prices coincide with the initial prices in the ¯rst two periods in
the corresponding experimental group, while the initial impacts of all heuristics are equal to
0:25. Fig. 7 suggests that the switching model with four heuristics ¯ts the experimental data
quite nicely.
It is useful to brie°y discuss the di®erences of the stochastic simulations in Fig. 7 with the
\simulated paths" in Anufriev and Hommes (2009). At each time step, the simulated path only
uses simulated price data as inputs to compute the heuristics' forecasts and to update their
impacts. Therefore, the simulated paths are essentially 50 period ahead forecasts generated
by the nonlinear switching model. These simulated paths already showed that the nonlinear
switching model (augmented by the same small noise as in the experiment) is capable of
generating all three di®erent patterns observed in the experimental data. In contrast, the one-
step ahead predictions of the nonlinear switching model in Fig. 7 use past experimental price
data, i.e., exactly the same information that was available to participants in the experiments,
as inputs for the forecasting rules and the updating of fractions. An immediate observations
by comparing these simulations is that the one-period ahead forecasts can follow more easily
the sustained oscillations as well as the dampened oscillatory patterns. While the simulated

























































































































































































Figure 7: Laboratory experiments and one-step ahead predictions of the evolution-
ary model. Upper parts of panels show prices for laboratory experiments in di®erent groups
(red) with corresponding one-step ahead predictions of the evolutionary model (blue). Lower parts
of panels show predictions and forecasting errors (inner frames) of four heuristics: adaptive expec-
tations (ADA, purple), weak trend followers (WTR, black), strong trend followers (STR, blue) and
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Figure 8: Evolution of heuristic impacts during the one-step ahead predictions of
the model. Fractions of four forecasting heuristics: adaptive expectations (ADA, purple), weak
trend followers (WTR, black), strong trend followers (STR, blue) and anchoring adjustment heuristic
(LAA, red).
impact of strong trend followers is su±ciently large, the one-step ahead forecasts easily follow
oscillatory patterns starting from a uniform initial distribution of forecasting rules, i.e., n1;0 =
n2;0 = n3;0 = n4;0 = 0:25.
Fig. 8 shows how, for the one step ahead forecasts, in di®erent groups di®erent heuristics are
taking the lead after starting from a uniform distribution. In the monotonically converging
groups, the impact of the di®erent rules stays more or less equal, although the impact of
25adaptive expectations gradually increases and slightly dominates the other rules in the last
20-25 periods. The oscillatory groups yield similar results as before, with the LAA rule
dominating the market early and its impact increasing to about 90% towards the end of the
experiment. Notice, that the domination of the LAA rule happens much faster in simulations
for group 1, than for group 6. (For instance, 80% impact is reached by the LAA rule after
20 periods for group 1 and after 40 periods for group 6.) This di®erence re°ects the fact that
the frequency of oscillations in the two experimental groups were not the same. During the
experiment we observe about 6 \cycles" in group 1, but only about 4 and a half \cycles" in
group 6. The stochastic one-step ahead simulations match the oscillations closely and produce
clear di®erence in the evolution of impacts. Our model thus explains oscillatory behavior by
coordination on the LAA rule by most subjects, and gives higher relative weight to the LAA
when the oscillations are more frequent.
Finally, for the groups with the dampened oscillations, one step ahead forecast produces a
rich evolutionary selection dynamics, see the bottom panel of 8. The groups with dampened
oscillations go through three di®erent phases where the STR, the LAA and the ADA heuristics
subsequently dominate. The STR dominates during the initial phase of a strong trend in prices,
but starts declining after it misses the ¯rst turning point of the trend. The LAA does a better
job in predicting the trend reversal and its impact starts increasing. The LAA takes the lead
in the second phase of the experiment, with oscillating prices. But the oscillations slowly
dampen and therefore, between periods 30-35, the impact of adaptive expectations, which has
been the worst performing rule until that point, starts increasing and adaptive expectations
dominates the groups in the last 7-9 periods.
5.2 Forecasting performance
Table 2 compares the mean squared error (MSE) of the one-step ahead prediction for 10
di®erent models: the RE fundamental prediction, six homogeneous expectations models (naive
expectations, the ¯xed anchor and adjustment (AA) rule, and each of the four heuristics of
the switching model), and three heterogeneous expectations models with 4 heuristics, namely,
the model with ¯xed fractions (corresponding to ± = 1), the switching model with benchmark
parameters ¯ = 0:4, ´ = 0:7 and ± = 0:9, and, ¯nally, the \best" switching model ¯tted
by means of a grid search in the parameter space (the last three lines in Table 2 show the
corresponding optimal parameter values). The MSEs for the benchmark switching model are
shown in bold and, for comparison, for each group the MSEs for the best among the four
heuristics are also shown in bold. The best among 10 models for each group is shown in
26italic.10
An immediate observation from Table 2 is that, for all groups, the fundamental prediction
rule is by far the worst. This is due to the fact that in the experiment realized prices deviate
persistently from the fundamental benchmark. Another observation is that, all models ex-
plain the monotonically converging groups very well, with very low MSE.11 The homogeneous
expectations models with naive, adaptive or WTR expectations ¯t the monotonic converging
groups particularly well, some of them slightly better than the benchmark switching model.
For the permanent as well as the dampened oscillatory groups, the °exible LAA rule is the
best homogeneous expectations benchmark, but the benchmark switching model has an even
smaller MSE especially in the permanently oscillating group 6 and the dampened oscillatory
groups 4 and 7.
To summarize, the evolutionary learning model is able to make the best out of di®erent
heuristics. Indeed, none of the homogeneous expectations models ¯ts all di®erent observed
patterns, but for each group in the experiment, the lowest MSE is achieved by the best ¯t
10We evaluate the MSE over 47 periods, for t = 4;:::;50. This minimizes the impact of the initial conditions
(i.e., the initial impacts of the heuristics) for the switching model, since t = 4 is the ¯rst period when the
prediction is computed with both the heuristics forecasts and the heuristics impacts being updated based on
the experimental data. For comparison, in all other models we compute errors also from t = 4.
11The only exception is the AA rule, which performs relatively well in the oscillatory groups, but not so well
in the monotonically converging groups.
Table 2: MSE over 47 periods of the one-step ahead forecast for di®erent groups and 10
di®erent model speci¯cations.
Speci¯cation Group 2 Group 5 Group 1 Group 6 Group 4 Group 7
RE Fundamental Prediction 16.6231 10.8238 15.7581 9.3245 300.9936 21.9123
naive 0.0388 0.0514 3.5415 2.4494 141.0558 13.2453
AA 5.1259 3.4323 2.9309 0.888 65.2296 5.0594
ADA 0.0712 0.0378 5.6734 4.6095 210.3313 19.5158
WTR 0.0862 0.1419 2.0905 1.1339 92.2163 9.2932
STR 0.5001 0.6605 2.9071 0.8131 124.3494 14.7224
LAA 0.4588 0.4756 0.456 0.6591 66.2637 5.8635
4 heuristics (± = 1) 0.0814 0.1698 1.2417 0.6618 70.8516 7.0956
4 heuristics (Figs. 7-8) 0.0646 0.1108 0.4672 0.2917 47.2492 4.3154
4 heuristics (best ¯t) 0.0493 0.0353 0.4423 0.1655 34.4932 2.9358
¯ 2 [0;10] 10 10 0.1 10 3 0.2
´ 2 [0;1] 0.4 0.9 1 0.1 0.8 0.5
± 2 [0;1] 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.4
27Table 3: Out-of-sample performance of the heuristic switching model and the AR(2)
model. The in-sample (for t = 0;:::;43) MSE, the model parameters and 1¡;:::;7¡ periods ahead
out of sample squared forecasting errors are shown. The top part: the best ¯tted in-sample model.
The middle part: the benchmark model. The bottom part: AR(2) model estimated in-sample.
Group 2 Group 5 Group 1 Group 6 Group 4 Group 7
Best Fit Switching Model
MSE40 0.0567 0.035 0.4419 0.1748 39.0888 3.3207
(¯;´;±) (10,0.4,0.9) (10,0.9,0.8) (0.1,1,0.5) (10,0.1,0.7) (3.3,0.8,0.6) (0.2,0.5,0.4)
1 p ahead 0.0073 0.0033 0.4047 0.0305 12.9584 0.227
2 p ahead 0.0016 0.0224 2.7536 0.3976 34.0954 0.5575
3 p ahead 0.0004 0.0968 3.2215 0.2927 0.0001 3.4523
4 p ahead 0.0041 0.2536 0.4972 0.0004 5.5048 2.3656
5 p ahead 0.0033 0.195 3.8239 1.5924 3.4314 0.0225
6 p ahead 0.0054 0.2558 13.4333 6.6856 2.5055 1.3214
7 p ahead 0.0219 0.5148 7.8308 7.8088 0.6532 0.057
Benchmark Switching Model
MSE40 0.0681 0.1016 0.4878 0.277 54.3656 4.9562
(¯;´;±) (0.4,0.7,0.9) (0.4,0.7,0.9) (0.4,0.7,0.9) (0.4,0.7,0.9) (0.4,0.7,0.9) (0.4,0.7,0.9)
1 p ahead 0.0237 0.0868 0.163 0.5207 9.9201 0.0136
2 p ahead 0.0194 0.0936 1.7627 2.1952 9.6271 1.5339
3 p ahead 0.0056 0.0958 3.1846 1.3149 11.8802 4.7197
4 p ahead 0.0001 0.2029 1.6712 0.0082 33.93 3.2143
5 p ahead 0.0782 0.0029 0.8245 4.2719 23.2122 0.1401
6 p ahead 0.0282 0.0174 7.5393 14.1611 21.2178 0.4239
7 p ahead 0.0314 0.5498 6.8731 14.0603 16.5857 0.0388
AR(2) Model
MSE44 0.2303 0.2315 0.7385 0.2672 65.3395 5.3652
(¯1, ¯2, ¯3) (8.94, 0.91, -0.07) (6.77, 0.75, 0.13) (27.06, 1.39, -0.87) (18.88, 1.64, -0.96) (26.36, 1.30, -0.75) (29.39, 1.20, -0.70)
1 p ahead 1.0385 0.9997 0.0985 1.0364 13.3249 0.1057
2 p ahead 0.7992 0.1967 0.1547 2.6497 2.2298 3.9212
3 p ahead 1.1925 0.2304 0.6581 4.7738 58.221 5.913
4 p ahead 0.2565 0.1628 1.3953 1.3237 135.6244 3.91
5 p ahead 0.7563 0.0333 0.6525 0.0253 85.4903 0.0767
6 p ahead 2.7673 0.7527 13.3626 0.0072 31.3737 4.8219
7 p ahead 2.6237 0.223 18.3608 0.113 6.62 1.7284
switching model. The only exception is group 2 with monotonic convergence, where the
errors are very low, and the di®erence between the best heuristic (naive expectations) and the
switching model is minor. Finally, the benchmark switching model also yields low MSEs for
all groups, only slightly above the best ¯t switching model. This suggest that the good ¯t of
the switching model is fairly robust w.r.t. the model parameters.
285.3 Out-of-sample forecasting
Let us now turn to the out of sample validation of the model. In order to evaluate the out-
of-sample forecasting performance of the model, we ¯rst perform a grid search to ¯nd the
parameters of the model minimizing the MSE for periods t = 4;:::;43. Then, the squared
forecasting errors of the \best" model are computed for the next 7 periods. The results are
reported in the upper part of Table 3 for each group. In the middle part of the table, we also
report the corresponding squared prediction errors for the switching model with benchmark
parameters. Finally, we compare our structural learning model with a simple non-structural
model with three parameters. To this purpose we estimate an AR(2) model to the data up
to period t = 43 and show in the bottom part of Table 3 the in- and out-of-sample squared
prediction errors.
For the converging groups 2 and 5 the squared prediction errors typically increase with
horizon but remain very low and comparable with the MSEs computed in-sample. This is
not surprising given that the qualitative property of the data (i.e., monotonic convergence)
does not change in the last periods, and that the adaptive heuristic, which generates such
convergence, takes a lead already around period 40 (cf. Fig. 8). In the oscillating groups 1
and 6 the out-of-sample errors generated by the switching model are varying with the time
horizon. The errors are especially large for the 6¡ and 7¡periods ahead forecasts. The
ultimate reason for the relatively large prediction errors is the oscillating behavior observed
in the experiment. Even if the switching model with leading LAA heuristic captures this
phenomenon qualitatively and also produces oscillations, the error can become large when
the two types of oscillations have di®erent frequencies and the prediction goes out of phase.
Notice that the same forecasting problem arises also for the AR(2) model in group 1. The
prediction errors for the groups 4 and 7 with damping oscillations are not very high, when
compared with the in-sample MSE. This is because, towards the end of the experiment, in
both treatments convergence was observed. At the end of the in-sample period, i.e., at t = 43,
the switching model does not yet clearly select the ADA heuristic for group 4, but does select
it for group 7. That explains why the forecasting errors in group 4 are larger than in group 7.
Comparing the forecasting errors of the switching and AR(2) models we conclude that the
former model is better than the latter, on average. More speci¯cally, in the converging group
5 and oscillating group 6 the out-of-sample performances are very similar, but in the groups
1, 2, 4 and 7 the di®erent variations of the switching model outperform the AR(2) model
out-of-sample. Furthermore, in group 4, for 3¡, 4¡ and 5¡ periods ahead predictions, the
AR(2) model produces errors larger than 7 in absolute value, which would lead to 0 earnings
29Table 4: Out-of-sample performance of the heuristic learning model and of the
AR(2) model. The averaged in-sample MSE (for t = j;:::;43+j with j = 0;:::;5) and averaged
1¡ and 2¡ periods ahead squared forecasting errors are shown. The top part: the best ¯tted in-
sample switching model. The middle part: the benchmark switching model. The bottom part: AR(2)
model estimated in-sample.
Group 2 Group 5 Group 1 Group 6 Group 4 Group 7
Best Fit Switching Model
average MSE40 0.0422 0.0383 0.4519 0.1702 42.6314 3.6141
1 p ahead 0.0122 0.0321 0.479 0.1921 15.0395 0.7857
2 p ahead 0.0122 0.0901 1.8599 1.0792 57.5144 1.5543
Benchmark Switching Model
average MSE40 0.0641 0.1037 0.5242 0.2869 58.2751 5.0055
1 p ahead 0.0417 0.1456 0.4186 0.4097 7.694 0.7922
2 p ahead 0.0801 0.2304 1.5871 1.9035 16.2213 1.9338
AR(2) Model
average MSE40 0.2338 0.2407 0.6897 0.2514 65.7466 4.7867
1 p ahead 0.3732 0.4431 0.9981 0.5568 13.4616 0.6682
2 p ahead 0.5052 0.4045 3.5823 1.4944 44.6453 2.0098
in the experiment, see (2.4). The switching model never has such large errors.
To further investigate one- and two-period ahead out-of-sample forecasting performance,
we ¯t the model on a moving sample and compute an average of the corresponding squared
prediction errors. The results of this exercise for the same three models (best ¯t, benchmark,
and AR(2)) are presented in Table 4. The smallest forecasting errors within the same class
(e.g., one-period ahead in group 4) are shown in italic. It turns out that our nonlinear switching
model predicts the experimental data better than the simple AR(2) model for both one- and
two-period ahead predictions in all groups except for groups 4 and group 1 for the one-period
ahead prediction (for group 4, the average out-of-sample prediction of the benchmark switching
model however outperforms the AR2 model). In many cases the di®erence in performance is
substantial.
306 Conclusion and Discussion
The time evolution of aggregate economic variables, such as stock prices, is a®ected by market
expectations of individual agents. Neo-classical economic theory assumes that individuals form
expectations rationally, thus enforcing prices to track economic fundamentals and leading to
an e±cient allocation of resources. Laboratory experiments with human subjects have shown
however that individuals do not behave fully rational, but instead follow simple heuristics. In
laboratory markets prices may show persistent deviations from fundamentals similar to the
large swings observed in real stock prices.
Our results show that performance based evolutionary selection among simple forecasting
heuristics can explain coordination of individual behavior leading to three di®erent aggregate
outcomes observed in recent laboratory market forecasting experiments: slow monotonic price
convergence, oscillatory dampened price °uctuations and persistent price oscillations. In our
model forecasting strategies are selected every period from a small population of plausible
heuristics, such as adaptive expectations and trend following rules. Individuals adapt their
strategies over time, based on the relative forecasting performance of the heuristics. As a
result, the evolutionary switching mechanism exhibits path dependence and matches individual
forecasting behavior as well as aggregate market outcomes in the experiments. Our results are
in line with recent work on agent-based models of interaction and contribute to a behavioral
explanation of universal features of ¯nancial markets.
Our approach is similar to other models of reinforcement learning, e.g. Arthur (1991),
Arthur (1993), Erev and Roth (1998) and Camerer and Ho (1999). However, our model is built
in a market environment di®erent from the strategic environments usually studied in standard
game theory. For example, agents in our framework do not have a well de¯ned strategy, other
than predicting a number between 0 and 100 (in two decimals) and the strategies used in our
switching model are state dependent. Moreover, individuals do not know the \payo® matrix",
which is moreover changing over time in a path-depended manner. To our best knowledge,
the model presented in this paper is the ¯rst learning model explaining di®erent time series
patterns in the same laboratory experiments.
How robust are these results? While it is beyond the scope of the current paper to study in
detail the performance of our nonlinear switching model in other market environments, Fig. 9
illustrates how well our switching model ¯ts some other learning to forecast asset pricing
experimental groups in Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and Velden (2005). Price behaviour
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Figure 9: One-step ahead predictions of the evolutionary switching model for four
other experimental groups: (from top to bottom) group with typing error, group
with fundamental 40, group without robot traders, group with possibility to sub-
mit price forecasts up to 1000. Left panels show prices in experiments (red) with correspond-
ing one-step ahead predictions of the switching model (blue). Right panels show corresponding
fractions of the four heuristics: adaptive expectations (ADA, purple), weak trend followers (WTR,
black), strong trend followers (STR, blue) and anchoring and adjustment heuristic (LAA, red).
32fundamental price 60, but suddenly falls in period t = 41, probably due to a typing error of
one of the participants12. Our nonlinear switching model of course misses the typing error,
but nevertheless matches the overall pattern before and after the unexpected price drop quite
nicely. Group 8 (second panel) is an example with a fundamental price of 40 (instead of 60),
whose strong oscillations are captured by an initially dominating STR rule, until the LAA
rule becomes dominating after period 40. Group 12 (third panel) is an example without robot
traders (i.e. its fraction nt in the price generating law of motion (2.2) is ¯xed to 0). Large
amplitude price oscillations, with prices almost reaching their maximum 100 and minimum 0,
arise, but prices stabilize towards the end of the experiment. The evolution of the impacts of
the four forecasting heuristics is similar to the case of dampening price oscillations considered
before (see the lower panels of Figure 8), with the strong trend rule (STR) initially dominating
the market, followed by the anchor and adjustment rule (LAA) taking over around period 25,
and the adaptive expectations (AA) rule ¯nally dominating towards the end. Finally, group
2 in the \bubble experiments" of Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and van de Velden (2008)
(see bottom panel) is another example without robot traders, this time with a much larger
upper-bound of 1000 (instead of 100). The asset price oscillates with very large amplitude,
with a long lasting rend of 25 periods with prices rising close to their maximum 1000, after
which a crash follows to values close to their minimum 0, and the market starts ocillating.
The evolution of the impacts of the four forecasting heuristics is similar as before, with the
STR rule taking the lead, increasing its share to more than 80% after 25 periods, then slowly
declining and ¯nally dominated by the LAA rule with more than 60% of the share after 50
periods. The fact that our nonlinear switching model nicely captures all patterns in these
di®erent groups shows that the model is robust concerning changes of the asset pricing market
environment.
In a related paper, Hommes and Lux (2009) explain learning to forecast experiments
in the classical cobweb (hog-cycle) market environment, using a heterogeneous expectations
model, where individual agents use a genetic algorithm. The GA-learning model captures
all stylized facts of the cobweb markets, both at the individual and at the aggregate level,
quite nicely across di®erent experimental treatments. In the cobweb markets, aggregate price
behavior is quite di®erent and much more irregular, characterized by random looking (i.e.
12The sudden fall of the asset price in group 3 from 55.10 in period 40 to 46.93 in period 41 is due to the
fact that one of the participants predicts 5.25 for period 42. It is likely that this corresponds to a typing error
(perhaps his/her intention was to type 55.25), since this participants ¯ve previous predictions all were between
55.00 and 55.40.
33zero-autocorrelations) price °uctuations around the RE benchmark price. The amplitude
of these price °uctuations depends critically upon underlying parameters, especially upon
the slopes of demand and supply curves. In the case when the cobweb market is stable
under naive expectations, the laboratory experiments as well as the GA-simulations, nicely
converge to the RE benchmark price. On the other hand, when the cobweb is unstable
under naive expectations, experimental as well as GA-simulated prices are characterized by
large price °uctuations (much higher than under RE, i.e. there is excess price volatility)
with zero autocorrelations. Our performance based switching heuristics model can easily
explain the stable treatment in the cobweb experiments, with convergence to RE due to
a dominating adaptive expectations rule, but has di±culty in capturing simultaneously the
high price volatility with randomly (no autocorrelations) looking prices. Apparently, the
random looking behavior of strongly °uctuating prices is better captured by the mutation-noise
driven GA-simulations than by our simple heuristics switching model. We conjecture that our
simple heuristics switching model works well in market environments with some structure and
persistence in price °uctuations, either in the form of converging prices or in the presence of
price oscillations and (temporary) price trends and bubbles. A more systematic investigation
in which market environments other than the asset pricing framework our nonlinear heuristics
switching model can explain individual forecasting behavior as well as aggregate price behavior
is beyond the scope of this paper and left as an important topic for future research.
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37APPENDIX
A Proof of Proposition 3.1
From the general relation (3.2) it follows that
pe
t+1 ¡ pf = w(pt¡1 ¡ pf) + (1 ¡ w)(pe






+ 1 ¡ w
´
:
The expression in the last parenthesis is a convex combination of 1 and (1 ¡ nt¡1)=(1 + r) < 1. For
positive weight w such combination is always less than 1. Therefore, the dynamical system de¯nes
a contraction of expectations, which then must globally converge to pf. The price realization in this
point is uniquely de¯ned from (2.6) as p¤ = pf. Finally, the evolution of robot traders implies that
n¤ = 0 in this ¯xed-point.
B Proof of Proposition 3.2
Consider the steady-state (p¤;n¤) with consistent forecasting rule, and notice that (3.2) implies that
either p¤ = pf or 1 ¡ n¤ = 1 + r. The second case is impossible, so p¤ = pf and, therefore, n¤ = 0.
Using (3.2), the dynamics in deviations is given by
pt ¡ pf = exp
³












The ¯rst term in the right hand-side is never greater than 1. Thus, dynamics of (B.1) is a superpo-
sition of contraction with linear process of second order
(1 + r)xt = ¯1 xt¡1 + ¯2 xt¡2 (B.2)
with xt = pt ¡ pf. If the latter dynamics is locally stable, the steady-state pf of original dynamics
(B.1) will be also locally stable. Furthermore, since the exponential term in (B.1) is equal to 1 in the
steady-state, the linear parts of the dynamics of the last two processes are the same. Thus, processes
(B.1) and (B.2) lose stability simultaneously and through the same bifurcation type.














The standard conditions for the stability can be expressed through the trace Tr(J) and the determi-
nant Det(J) of this matrix, and are given by
Tr(J) < Det(J) + 1; Tr(J) > ¡1 ¡ Det(J); Det(J) < 1: (B.3)
38Furthermore, the dynamics is oscillatory if Tr(J)2 ¡ 4Det(J) = 0. The substitution of the values of
trace and determinant gives inequalities (3.4) and condition ¯2
1 +4¯2(1+rf) < 0 for the oscillations.
The bifurcation types can be determined from (B.3), since when one of these inequalities turns to
equality, the unit circle is crossed by a corresponding eigenvalue of the system. the second inequality
is violated when an eigenvalue becomes equal to ¡1, which implies the period-doubling bifurcation.
The violation of the last inequality in (B.3) implies that two complex eigenvalues cross the unit
circle. This happens under the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. Finally, consider the ¯rst inequality,
which is violated when one eigenvalue becomes equal to 1. It turns out that at this occasion two new
steady-states are emerging, which implies that the system exhibits pitchfork bifurcation. Indeed, any
steady-state (p¤;n¤) should satisfy to
(1 + r)p¤ = (1 ¡ n¤)
¡
(1 ¡ ¯1 ¡ ¯2)pf + (¯1 + ¯2)p¤¢
+ n¤pf + ¹ y
m
(1 + r)p¤ = pf + (¯1 + ¯2)(p¤ ¡ pf)(1 ¡ n¤) + ¹ y
m
(1 + r)(p¤ ¡ pf) = (¯1 + ¯2)(p¤ ¡ pf)(1 ¡ n¤)
Thus, in any non-fundamental steady-state, the fractions of robots n¤ = 1¡(1+r)=(¯1 +¯2). Only
if this fraction belongs to the interval (0;1) two other steady-states exist with
p¤
§ = pf § 200 log(1 ¡ n¤):
(The prediction rule is, of course, inconsistent in both steady-states.) When the ¯rst inequality in
(B.3) is satis¯ed, these two steady-state do not exist, but they appear at the moment when the
inequality changes it sign.
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